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Abstract Lisa Borgerding’s work highlights how students can understand evolution
without necessarily committing to it, and how learners may come to see it as one available
way of thinking amongst others. This is presented as something that should be considered a
successful outcome when teaching about material that many students may find incom-
patible with their personal worldviews. These findings derive from work exploring a cause
ce´le`bre of the science education community—the teaching of natural selection in cultural
contexts where learners feel they have strong reasons for rejecting evolutionary ideas.
Accepting that students may understand but not commit to scientific ideas that are (from
some cultural perspectives) controversial may easily be considered as a form of compro-
mise position when teaching canonical science prescribed in curriculum but resisted by
learners. Yet if we take scholarship on the nature of science seriously, and wish to reflect
the nature of scientific knowledge in science teaching, then the aim of science education
should always be to facilitate understanding of, yet to avoid belief in, the ideas taught in
science lessons. The philosophy of science suggests that scientific knowledge needs to be
understood as theoretical in nature, as conjectural and provisional; and the history of
science warns of the risks of strongly committing to any particular conceptualisation as a
final account of some feature of nature. Research into student thinking and learning in
science suggests that learning science is often a matter of coming to understand a new
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viable way of thinking about a topic to complement established ways of thinking. Science
teaching should then seek to have students appreciate scientific ideas as viable ways of
making sense of the currently available empirical evidence, but should not be about per-
suading students of the truth of any particular scientific account.
Keywords Beliefs in science  Cultural border-crossing  Scientific knowledge  Teacher
as intellectual tour guide  Teaching evolution
Lisa A. Borgerding’s paper (present issue) is of considerable interest to the science edu-
cation community because of the continuing debate within science education on how to
respond to the difficulties of teaching natural selection and evolutionary ideas in contexts
where students may be resistant to accepting such ideas for cultural reasons—as for example
when they consider such ideas are contrary to their own, and their family and community’s,
religious commitments. To the extent that the science education community can be con-
sidered to have a unified position, there is considerable consensus on the need to teach
evolutionary theory regardless of the response among learners: yet there is less agreement
on the extent to which, and how, learners’ own ideas and beliefs should be taken into
account. This is an important issue because of the centrality of natural selection to modern
biology, and the active and organised opposition to the teaching of evolution in many parts
of the world. In the present article I will argue that whilst this is a live debate in relation to
evolution and a few other topics (the origin of the universe, for example), the issues raised
are more fundamental and concern the aims of science education more generally.
The argument to be made here concerns the nature of science and the kinds of
knowledge it can lead to, and the implications this has for the purpose of science education.
In brief, the argument to be made is that science education should aim for understanding of
scientific ideas, but not for belief in those ideas. To be clear, the argument is not just that
science education should not intend to bring about belief in scientific ideas, but rather that
good science teaching discourages belief in the scientific ideas being taught. I suspect that
many readers (though perhaps not all) will be persuaded of the reasonableness of this
position—but unfortunately we have good reason to think that actively teaching to avoid
students believing in scientific ideas may itself often be challenging.
The case of teaching evolution
It is widely accepted that evolution is a key topic in modern biology, and that indeed that
natural selection provides a perspective that is infused into virtually all aspects of the life
sciences (Dobzhansky 1973). Scientific societies and organisations around the world have
stressed the importance of including teaching of evolution in school and college biology
curricula (e.g., National Science Teachers Association 2013)—as in the United States
context where Borgerding carried out her study and where she reports how curriculum
documents emphasise ‘‘evolution as an overarching scientific concept holding a high status
within the scientific community’’. However natural selection and its implications seem
counter-intuitive to many people, and moreover are actually found objectionable to those
from some cultural backgrounds. Notions that human beings evolved from very different
kinds of life-forms; that there is no fundamental biological difference between humans and
other species; and indeed that if one was able to trace the lineage of any person alive today
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back through time one would reach a point where it was no longer clear if their ancestors
should be considered human (i.e., that there would likely be many not-clearly-human
generations falling between generations that would generally be agreed to be clearly
human, and considerably earlier generations that would generally be clearly agreed to not
be human), seem to insult the intelligence and/or the sensitivities of many learners.
There are two sets of issues at work here. For scientists and science teachers long
familiar with the theory of natural selection it often provides an apparently simple (perhaps
even seemingly obvious) and rational framework for thinking about life on earth that is
used as a lens for examining biological topics. Indeed, it may be a conceptual ‘lens’
applied with regularity, thus reinforcing commitment to the value—and perhaps even the
‘truth’—of the theory. Yet understanding natural selection actually requires coordinating a
range of distinct ideas (variation, inheritance, geographic separation, etc.) into a coherent
conceptual scheme (Taber 2009, pp. 286–288): something which many school age (and
even college level) students find challenging. Like many ideas that seem obvious once we
‘get’ them, natural selection is not something most people come to understand readily.
Teaching evolution, then, involves the kind of challenge that is familiar in teaching
many conceptual topics in science education. In a similar way, the Newtonian idea that
objects continue to move with constant velocity when not acted upon by a force is counter-
intuitive to most people. The periodic table of elements provides another example of an
intellectual construction (like natural selection) which offers a valuable framework for
thinking about (and organising) ideas across a whole science—in this case chemistry rather
than biology—but which when first perceived at the student’s ‘resolution’ (i.e. from the
perspective of a novice) is too complex to be fully appreciated by most learners without
extended effort. Often a good deal of hard work is involved in mastering the scientific ideas
which—once we have mastered them—can be so productive in supporting further thinking.
Newtonian mechanics and periodicity in elemental properties may challenge some
learners for whom they do not make sense and so seem to represent a huge mental effort
(rather than offering an obvious promise of intellectual economy), but few students are likely
to find these ideas objectionable or personally insulting. Evolution, however, is considered by
many people in some cultures as an offensive ideology (Morris 2000). As Glen Aikenhead
(1996) has pointed out, the science curriculum may offer much that seems alien to some
students—so learners from some indigenous communities may find aspects of Western
science education content and practices to be somewhat at odds with the worldview they
have developed from within their own culture. Ironically (given the context of the discussion
here), one aspect of the Western scientific culture which learners from some indigenous
cultures find problematic is the treatment of non-human animals as classroom exhibits and
subjects for laboratory procedures (Allen and Crawley 1998) in a way that implies humanity
is on a very different footing (enquirers, controllers) to the rest of the natural world (subjects
of enquiry and control). A holistic mindset about nature that requires giving a high degree of
respect to members of other species that share our world may make it difficult to appreciate
the analytical, reductionist stance of some traditional school science.
Learning science as cultural border-crossing
In her paper, Borgerding adopts Aikenhead’s metaphor of cultural border-crossing with its
implication that the science classroom, and its particular norms, terminology, and values,
may seem a foreign place to many students, such that entering is akin to visiting another
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culturally distinct country. In Borgerding’s study this refers in particular to the acceptance
and championing of natural selection, and the ‘fact’ of evolution in general. Evolutionary
ideas are found objectionable by many people in some countries which are otherwise
largely supportive of Western Science—including large parts of the United States (Long
2011) where Borgerding carried out her study. For some students, evolution is seen as an
atheistic notion which threatens their religious faith, cherished core personal beliefs, and
the norms that regulate their community lives. Consequently, even when the teaching of
evolution is officially considered part of the core curriculum, it may be resisted, truncated,
omitted, or subverted. It is easy to understand why teachers would not wish to alienate their
students and the wider community by teaching something most of the local population may
consider objectionable—and which sometimes they reject personally themselves.
Arguments within the educational community have concerned how science educators
should respond to this resistance (Reiss 2008). Should teachers seek to set out the clear
superiority of the evolutionary perspective, its strong evidence base, its extensive appli-
cability in biology, and so forth, compared with the less scientifically defendable views of
learners? This after all is how science teachers often proceed when we discover students
have ‘misconceptions’: ideas at odds with target knowledge in the curriculum that need to
be challenged to bring about desired conceptual change. Yet this strategy is not always
effectively applied even in less contentious topics (Taber 2009). Students’ ideas may be
well established in their thinking, and when learners’ alternative (from the scientific per-
spective) conceptions have currency in the life-world they are often reinforced by everyday
interactions as part of the social milieu (Solomon 1992).
Sometimes even the most fecund scientific ideas may not be persuasive to those who are
well versed in alternative ways of thinking, unless there is a considerable period of
immersion and extensive experience of application of the new ways of making sense—as
seen with Joseph Priestley’s failure to adopt Antoine Lavoisier’s ideas about combustion
(Thagard 1992). In discussing his model of paradigm shifts in the history of science
Thomas Kuhn (1996, p. 151) drew upon a quotation from Max Planck to the effect that
new ideas in science triumph not when scientists who held a previous orthodoxy were
persuaded, but rather when they die leaving a new generation who have been inducted into
science on the basis of the successive theoretical framework.
Persuading students to change their minds about a well-established way of thinking
about an aspect of the natural world can often be a slow process even when there is nothing
more at stake than a way of conceptualising how forces relate to motion or how to
understand combustion. Expecting students to reject core personal commitments about the
world that people have historically been prepared to go to the stake for is asking a great
deal more. In the context of some United States communities accepting evolution is
equated with rejecting scripture considered to be the Word of God, and so to be going
against God and risking eternal damnation—as well as being seen to go against the beliefs
and values of family, friends and community. When respected authority figures in the
community reinforce a belief that accepting such ideas as recent creation (recent as in of
the order of the last 10,000 years: so called Young Earth Creationism), special creation of
different species, and the fall (i.e. the entry of sin into the world which undermined the
perfect harmony in nature and led to carnivores losing their previous vegetarian ways) is a
test of one’s faith in a creator God, then students have a very strong rationale for rejecting
evolutionary ideas.
Moreover, although scientists will suggest that the case for natural selection—drawing
upon a range of different lines of evidence from various branches of science—is over-
whelming, the extent to which this vast evidence base, and the arguments that link it to the
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case for evolution, can be presented in high school biology classes is clearly limited. Many
students in some communities will have more (and more regular) exposure to creationism
advocates’ arguments for why macro evolution—evolution at the level of main groups of
organisms—has not been demonstrated, and their claims about the flaws and errors in the
scientific case, than to the scientific grounds for accepting evolution. Evolution is one topic
in part of school science. For some students, creationism is a creed reinforced weekly over
many years. Both ‘sides’ (evolution deniers and champions) may accuse the other of
selective use of evidence, misrepresentation, and self-delusion—leaving students to make a
choice based on community membership and greater respect for one source of authority
rather than the quality of the case from evidence.
Science teaching as guiding not persuading
Given this situation, some science educators would argue that teachers should welcome
and value students’ views and invite them to join a conversation where their potentially
anti-evolutionary commitments are acknowledged and respectfully considered in the sci-
ence classroom (Reiss 2008). This argument starts from the assumption that simply
ignoring learners’ ideas and setting about teaching them something that appears to con-
tradict deeply held faith commitments is very unlikely to persuade students to accept
evolution and rather risks alienating students from science and the teacher. After all,
constructivist teaching approaches in less controversial topics suggest that it is important to
elicit and explore students’ ideas and to compare them with the scientific models (Driver
and Oldham 1986)—and this can seem even more sensible when we are aware that we are
dealing material that students will not only find counter-intuitive but perhaps objectionable.
This argument may take the form that ‘converting’ students to the scientific view over the
course of a few science lessons is not a feasible option, yet it may be possible to get them
to at least appreciate the scientific view so that they understand what it is they are rejecting,
and something of why many other intelligent and decent people find the arguments con-
vincing. Perhaps that is a seed and a suitable starting point for possible later changes of
thinking (cf. Long 2011), but even if not then perhaps understanding the gist of natural
selection is a reasonable goal when bringing about acceptance of evolution is simply not
feasible.
This might seem a compromise to many science educators, because it comes across as
more suitable for humanities teaching than science. In the humanities and social sciences it
is not unusual for teachers to present and explore alternative perspectives in class, without
seeking to persuade students of the ‘right’ approach to adopt. The aim of such teaching
may be to get students to appreciate different perspectives, and be able to compare them,
and to appreciate their strengths and weaknesses—and also why the preference a person
makes for a particular position often depends as much on their existing background
commitments as inherent qualities of that position.
Our existing understandings and value systems necessarily colour how we make sense
of any new ideas we meet. This was a point that Thomas Kuhn (1996) made based on his
historical studies of what he called paradigm shifts in science: that even in ‘objective’
science we cannot evaluate ideas in a totally neutral way as we are always adopting the
limited viewpoint(s) our particular existing understandings allow. As the anthropologist
Clifford Geertz (1973/2000, p. 35) noted, people ‘‘unmodified by the customs of particular
places do not in fact exist, have never existed, and most important, could not in the very
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nature of the case exist’’. It is the nature of being human, that we can only make sense of
new experiences through the interpretative resources we have iteratively constructed up to
that point; and that construction process will reflect the resources we can access in the
particular intellectual environment in which we develop (Taber 2013b). Kuhn’s account
was descriptive not prescriptive—he was not criticising the scientific ideal of working
towards objective knowledge, but pointing out that scientific consensus always occurs in a
historical context and so inevitably is somewhat culturally relative. Kuhn was not seeking
to have relativism admitted into science (as has sometimes been suggested), but simply
acknowledging that it could never be fully excluded.
Science teaching, however, has not generally tended to offer students a range of per-
spectives on a topic in the way that some other disciplines inherently do. In science classes
teachers usually present the current scientific consensus knowledge—or at least do their
best to offer a teaching model of the scientific ideas that is suitable for the academic level
of the students yet still true to the essence of the science. Many science teachers would
consider that is challenging enough, and that considering alternative perspectives in sci-
ence lessons would be a poor use of limited class-time, and could be potentially confusing
for many students. Indeed asking students to make sense of alternative perspectives and
appreciate how each may be preferred from some viable position is certainly more chal-
lenging for learners than simply telling them the version that scientists have come to accept
as the best current way of thinking about some particular topic (e.g. Perry 1970). Teaching
science as offering well-developed and evidenced, but uncertain, knowledge risks stu-
dents—and younger learners, who tend to expect knowledge of the world to be definitive
and factual, in particular—dismissing scientific accounts as little more than particular
scientists’ guesses or personal opinions about the world (Taber, Billingsley, Riga and
Newdick 2015).
In the case of teaching evolution in some cultural contexts, however, simply presenting
natural selection as the perspective to adopt will be resisted and risk alienation of students.
Borgerding’s study shows however that teachers who adopt the role of a guide to support
cultural-border crossing may be able to help students learn about natural selection and the
case for evolution in a less threatening way: not ‘this is what you are meant to think’, but
rather ‘this is how a lot of scientists who have spent time looking at the evidence think they
can best explain features of the natural world’. Students may not wish to emigrate to the
foreign territory they have been shown: but perhaps they will not find the visit too
threatening, and possibly they will be more willing to visit again in the future. If that is a
compromise on what many biology teachers would like to achieve, it seems a sensible and
honourable one when the alternative may be to set up teaching about evolution as an
invitation to accept or reject something which is contrary to students’ core lifeworld
commitments.
Cultural border crossing should not be seen as a compromise
but the model for science pedagogy
Yet there is an alternative perspective here as well: one which does not see teacher-as-a-
cultural-guide as a compromise on ‘teacher-as-scientific-prosthelytiser’, but rather sees
teaching-as-persuading-students-of-the-science as being the compromise, and a rather poor
one at that. Science, like the humanities and social sciences, has plenty of contention, and
indeed the essence of science is not the learning of current consensus ideas, but the active
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work going on at the boundaries of knowledge where scientists do not yet agree on how
best to conceptualise particular features of the natural world. Teaching which largely
presents (in retrospect) consensus scientific models often divorced from the processes by
which they became accepted gives a distorted view of the scientific enterprise as relatively
straightforward application of logic leading to the scientific community adopting
unproblematic ‘scientific knowledge’ (Taber 2011). This is both unauthentic and—com-
pared to science itself—dull.
In particular, teaching science as a ‘rhetoric of conclusions’ (Schwab 1962) misrepre-
sents the nature of scientific knowledge. At one time scientists may have considered they
were extracting ‘truth’ from nature through observation and experimentation (Pesic 1999).
The tradition of natural theology was based on metaphysical commitments to the natural
world as a record of the works of a creator God, who had created people in His own
image—and so able to read the ‘book of nature’ (Taber 2013a). The notion of science as an
objective process revealing eternal truths is no longer viable given much scholarship about
the history and philosophy of science. So, for example, Karl Popper (1934/1959) argued
that induction could not logically lead to definitive proofs, Thomas Kuhn (1996) suggested
that all scientists were inherently biased by the conceptual frameworks they bring to a
problem, and Imre Lakatos (1970) described how scientists regularly ‘quarantined’
inconvenient results and saw them as puzzles that could be ignored for the time being,
rather than refutations of their ideas. It is now widely recognised that all scientific
knowledge is conjectural in nature, and that all tests of hypotheses are actually tests of
conjunctions of the focal idea plus various background assumptions and theories relating to
the instrumentation of data collection and analysis (so that what a test refutes is not
necessarily the explicit hypothesis itself). Theories are always underdetermined by data
(that is, there is always another theory someone could construct which would also fit with
the available evidence), and models have ranges of application. Even laws may not be as
universal as once assumed if they might have themselves evolved along with the universe.
None of this undermines the value or utility of science, but it does mean that science
teachers are teaching (at least in principle, somewhat) provisional knowledge, because
science is always open to new evidence, and there is nothing we can be sure we understand
so well that further evidence would not offer a better conceptualisation. Newton’s
mechanics was once assumed to be the scientific description of some important features of
the way the universe is, until tests of the consequences of Einstein’s conjecture about the
invariance of the speed of light showed that Newton’s mechanics was just a model
which—although of wide application—would not always ‘work’. That these flawed ideas
were good enough to be used to get people to the moon and back safely only underlined
how science can never assume it has reached final, ultimate, truth. This also showed how
even though science can not be taken as offering absolute truth—it can still offer con-
ceptual tools of immense power and value.
Our modern understanding of the nature of science, what might be labelled a post-
positivist view of science, is of a powerful process that produces knowledge that is of great
utility. In terms of the philosophical ideal of knowledge as true, justified, belief scientific
‘knowledge’ falls well short—it is never assumed to be true, it is only provisionally justified,
and it needs to be entertained and considered rather than believed. If we wish science
education to offer an authentic reflection of the nature of science then scientific ideas should
not be presented as factual, and proved—but as theories, and models, as hypotheses which
have survived repeated testing to date, but which are always kept open to further scrutiny.
Some of these ideas have proved so good at representing nature that we might reasonably
treat them as almost certain. Others may be better characterised as our current best guesses.
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We are well aware that many canonical scientific ideas only work up to a point—within a
certain range of application or to a given level of approximation. There is no sense in asking
which is the correct model of the atom, or which is the best theory of acidity—as the answer
to these questions depends upon the particular purpose we have in mind. Even conceptual
tools as useful in making sense of the natural world such as ‘molecule’ and ‘species’ fail to
provide clear absolute discriminations under some conditions.
These characteristics and limitations are only flaws if we expect science to provide
absolute and final truths. If however we see science as an on-going process of developing
useful descriptions, characterisations, and models to inform our understanding of—and
action in—the natural world, then science is highly successful. The provisional nature of
scientific knowledge may even make science seem less arrogant, and perhaps seeing
science as a dynamic enterprise will attract more students to consider careers in science.
Presenting scientific ideas along the lines of ‘we can usefully model’ (the electron as a kind
of wave…semiconductor properties in terms of bands of overlapping molecular orbi-
tals…the relationship between different hominid species during human evolution) rather
than ‘this is how scientists have determined (i.e., believe) the world is’ offers a more
authentic reflection of the nature of scientific knowledge.
An attraction of an authentic representation of scientific knowledge in science education
is a move away from teaching that many learners find frustrating where more advanced
courses seem to contradict what they had worked hard to learn in earlier introductory
classes. Appreciating that science is not about truths, but rather is about viable construc-
tions of the world—ways of making sense of nature that are worth keeping in the con-
ceptual toolbox because they are useful—would allow learners to appreciate, for example,
a planetary model of the atom as just that, a model, and a definition of oxidation in terms of
electron transfer as just one useful way of making sense of some types of reactions. If
students are taught in this way then subsequent teaching of the atomic orbital concept has a
better chance of not being simply assimilated into the previously learnt and established
planetary atom and the notion of formal oxidation states need not be a threat to a hard-won
understanding of redox in terms of electron transfer (Taber 2010). Readers will likely be
able to add many further examples of their own.
Science is not about belief
In particular, the approach to teaching science discussed here avoids encouraging ‘belief’
in the science taught because belief is not an appropriate term for scientific commitment.
Indeed openness to disbelief in scientific accounts of the world is a core commitment of
science. One of the particular values considered to be central to the scientific enterprise is
the ability to remain sceptical and potentially critical of all ideas—even those that have
proved their usefulness to us time and again. This attitude is largely contrary to the natural
attitude and the inherent biases of human cognition (Nickerson 1998). Even scientists can
fall into what George Kelly (1958/1969, p. 85) called a ‘‘common pitfall of so-called
objective thinking, the tendency to reify our constructs and treat them as if they were not
constructs at all, but actually all the things that they were originally only intended to
construe’’. Arguably, the self-critical faculty that holds all knowledge as conjectural and
open to revision is one of the most useful things science education can seek to teach.
Teaching students to consider scientific ideas of high utility, yet not something to be
believed, means adding an additional dimension to all scientific ideas taught (e.g. relating
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to the range of application, or extent of supporting evidence). As noted above, younger
learners tend to more readily interpret the world in terms of absolute truths rather than
ideas that may often be useful, but may not always apply (D. Kuhn 1999)—so even when
teachers are quite clear in their own minds about the conjectural status of scientific
knowledge this is unlikely to be communicated unless it is made explicit in teaching.
Despite the challenge here, teaching this way has great potential advantages. So, for
example, teachers will not need to get learners to stop believing that all chemical bonds are
covalent or ionic (in order to teach about metallic bonds, or polar bonds) if students were
encouraged not to believe that bonds are ionic or covalent in the first place. If science
education is always approached as being about introducing useful concepts, models, and
theories, then students can be taught, for example, some useful models of bonding as
helpful conceptualisations, without learners considering they should take this as an
absolute, proved and final description of nature.
The teacher as intellectual tour guide in the light of the nature of personal
knowledge
One area of major research activity in science education has been the exploration of students’
ideas about scientific topics (Duit 2009). Students have been said to have alternative
frameworks or misconceptions, and to construct scientifically inappropriate conceptions of
the world drawing upon implicit knowledge elements that channel the learner’s interpreta-
tion of their observations and instruction. However, the research has also made it clear that
describing learners’ knowledge structures is difficult because thinking (which itself can only
be indirectly observed when it is represented publicly by the thinker) is always in flux and is
often manifold. Research shows that ‘holding’ or ‘having’ an alternative conceptual
framework of a topic (in the sense of such ideas being elicited in research) does not imply not
also having an understanding of the canonical concept—and vice versa. Human knowledge
often tends to comprise a range of alternative constructions which are being explored and
tested against experience—and if this was not the case conceptual change would be even
more difficult to achieve. When exploring student thinking about science topics the
researcher has to be aware of the fluid and manifold nature of thinking about many topics and
consider the student’s knowledge as ‘‘the range of notions under current consideration as
possibly reflecting some aspect of how the world is’’ (Taber 2013b, p. 179).
From this perspective Aikenhead’s notion of cultural border-crossing can be seen to a
useful metaphor for science teaching—and not just when the science may offend for
cultural reasons. Learning that according to science fungi are not plants; that insects count
as animals but that spiders do not count as insects; that heat and temperature are quite
distinct; that the earth is not closer to the sun in Summer; that many safe and healthy foods
contain acids; and also that humans are considered to have evolved from something more
like a bacterium, may all seem somewhat strange and ‘other’ to many students. Borg-
erding’s teacher-as-cultural-tour-guide offered safe passage into the land of evolutionary
thinking allowing students to safely explore the landscape as a valued visitor without being
expected to commit to emigration or even being hard-sold a kind of intellectual time-share
in the alien land. Arguably there is much in the science curriculum which would benefit
from this approach because so many scientific accounts are ontologically strange to many
learners (Chi 1992), even when the scientific models and theories only seem to challenge
the students’ common sense and not their sense of common decency.
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If we take seriously the post-positivist view of scientific knowledge and seek to offer
authentic science education, and if we acknowledge the research showing that students’
knowledge structures are often manifold and in flux, then seeing science teaching in terms
of seeking to ‘replace’ students’ alternative conceptions with scientific truths makes little
sense. Science teaching should never be about getting students to believe the scientific
accounts, but should always be about inviting students to explore scientific ideas suffi-
ciently to see why they are considered viable and useful ways of construing the natural
world. It is not the job of the science teacher to persuade students to believe in natural
selection, but just to understand it well enough to appreciate why many scientists consider
it the best available theory based on a range of empirical evidence.
If science is not about belief, then having learners come out of science lessons believing
in evolution, or for that matter believing that magnetic fields lines are more concentrated
near the poles of a magnet, or believing that energy is always conserved, or believing that
acidic solutions contain solvated hydrogen ions, misses the point. Science education should
help students understand scientific ideas, and appreciate why these ideas are found useful,
and something of their status (for example when they have a limited range of application).
Once students can understand the scientific ideas then they become available as possible
ways of thinking about the world, and perhaps as notions under current consideration as
useful (but not final) accounts of how the world is. This allows them to explore the value of
these ideas in the future, and given sufficient familiarity and experience with them a learner
may in time come to freely commit to them as valuable conceptual tools. Perhaps they will
even come to believe that the scientific model or theory is the best way of understanding
some aspect of the natural world. Hopefully, however, they will recognise that judgement
is somewhat provisional, and they will not move on to mistake the model or theory for a
final account of how the world really is. Belief in science should be epistemological not
ontological: a belief in the scientific approach as the best way to develop viable under-
standings of the natural world. Ultimately in the case of natural selection such an approach
may do more to lead those with strong cultural rationale for rejecting evolution as an
account of the world to at least consider it as an alternative perspective worth thinking
about, than attempts to make them change their mind with sheer force of argument.
However, even if the teacher-as-cultural-tour-guide is not successful in teaching evolution,
she will at least offer a more authentic glimpse of the nature of scientific knowledge.
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